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Abstract 
This article examines the external and internal dimensions of post-conflict 
reconstruction in Sierra Leone. The United Nations, bilateral donors such as the United 
Kingdom, and transnational non-governmental organizations and aid agencies have 
been instrumental in providing much-needed external assistance to Sierra Leone during 
the latter stages of its civil war and in the immediate post-war period. Although foreign 
aid is a welcome source of external support for reconstruction efforts, it is finite like any 
other resource. Reconstruction must also address intangible issues such as corruption as 
well as the healing of society through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone. Diamond exports hold potential as an internal source to 
spur economic growth and reconstruction. However, as the article illustrates, many 
obstacles remain, ranging from governance weaknesses in terms of capacity and 
domestic regulatory schemes on diamonds to the existence of illicit mining and 
smuggling of diamonds to regional instability. 
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1 
Bette’ fo tumara bambai 
1 Introduction 
The above quote is an optimistic maxim that translates from Krio, the lingua franca of 
Sierra Leone, as ‘hope for the future’. More than three-and-a-half years after the official 
end to Sierra Leone’s civil war, the country faces the daunting task of reconstruction 
amid much hope but decreasing optimism. Owing to more than a decade of civil 
conflict, much in the way of infrastructure has been destroyed, such as roads, bridges, 
hospitals, schools, electricity grids, communication links, housing, and commercial 
enterprises. Notably, what little existed in terms of infrastructure prior to the outbreak of 
civil war was already in poor shape due to more than two decades of corruption and 
‘bad’ governance under Presidents Siaka Stevens (1968 to 1985) and Joseph Saidu 
Momoh (1985 to 1992). The social damage inflicted by the civil war should not be 
underestimated. Though difficult to assess in monetary terms, the losses incurred by 
Sierra Leoneans as a result of death, torture, injury, and displacement are substantial. 
Thus, the scope and depth of post-conflict reconstruction must extend beyond the 
simple rebuilding of physical infrastructure. Intangible social needs must be met, 
ranging from healing societal scars from the civil war to eradicating corruption in the 
public and corporate arenas. 
Post-conflict reconstruction is an imposing undertaking in any country, and it must be 
able to draw upon external and internal sources of support. The United Nations (UN), 
bilateral donors such as the United Kingdom, and transnational non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and aid agencies have been instrumental in providing external 
assistance to Sierra Leone during the latter stages of the civil war and in the immediate 
post-war period. Internally, the combination of local NGO efforts, a feisty media, and a 
small yet vibrant business sector has driven political and economic aspects of 
reconstruction. Diamond exports are growing at an impressive annual rate. However, 
the governing Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) still lacks effective capacity to 
implement various policies and legislation. Corruption in government and the corporate 
sectors remains, though reduced and better concealed in comparison to the past. 
The purpose of this article is to illustrate the above dimensions of post-conflict 
reconstruction in Sierra Leone. External and internal resources will be examined in 
order to assess the prospects for reconstruction efforts. Foreign aid represents the bulk 
of the external sources of support, though its imminent reduction is a significant 
concern. Donors have a history of drastically reducing assistance once stability returns 
to a country, which tends to coincide with the four-year anniversary of the official end 
of hostilities (DFID 2005: 13). Internal resources, such as diamond exports, offer much 
potential as a means to spur economic growth and reconstruction. While diamonds are 
being counted on for aiding reconstruction, this valuable natural resource may also very 
well disrupt reconstruction efforts. The chances for disruption are great as many 
governance obstacles remain, ranging from weaknesses in the international and 
domestic regulatory schemes on diamonds to illicit mining and smuggling of diamonds 
from mines located primarily in the Eastern part of Sierra Leone to regional instability 
in the Mano River basin. In short, lack of government capacity and the persistence of 
corruption are significant obstacles to successful reconstruction. It is uncertain—at least 
in the short term—whether these twin impediments will be overcome. 2 
2 Post-conflict  reconstruction 
The move from conflict to reconstruction is complex and subject to delays, reversals, 
and myriad unforeseen events. Addison (2003) identifies two key objectives for such a 
task. First, and logically, veritable peace must be present throughout the country. 
Second, the goal of ‘broad-based recovery that improves the incomes and human 
development indicators of the majority of people, especially the poor’ (Addison 2003: 3, 
original emphasis) must exist. If the individual is the primary focus of security—human 
security,1 more specifically—then conditions associated with economic wellbeing, 
adequate food, health, and environmental provisions, political freedoms, and the 
absence of wide-scale physical threat are relevant. Of interest, then, are factors ranging 
from quantitative indicators such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) figures, per capita income rates, human development index scores, and foreign 
aid inflows to qualitative measures such as perception of corruption, state-society 
relations, and the health of the ‘social fabric’ of post-war Sierra Leone. 
Most importantly, peace currently exists in Sierra Leone. January 2002 witnessed the 
completion of the disarmament process as well as the formal declaration that the civil 
war indeed was over. After nearly five years of operations, Sierra Leone’s National 
Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) came to an 
official close on 31 March 2004. A total of 72,490 combatants were disarmed as part of 
the NCDDR programme, and 71,043 were demobilized (UNOCHA 2004a). The 
reintegration phase consisted of a choice of vocational training, formal schooling, or 
receiving tools for various trades as well as farming. 63,545 former combatants 
participated in the reintegration segment, including 6,845 former child soldiers. 
Although these figures are impressive, approximately 9,000 former combatants did not 
complete the entire programme. In other words, about one in eight ex-combatants (12.5 
per cent) did not make it to the reintegration phase. The Executive Secretary of the 
NCDDR, Francis Kaikai, posited several reasons for the discrepancy, ranging from 
‘self-integration’ to avoiding the stigma of belonging to the rebel group, the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Most former members of the pro-Kabbah Civil 
Defence Forces (CDF) ‘were not interested in reintegration because they only fought to 
defend their villages’ (quoted in UNOCHA 2004a). 
Given its relative success, Sierra Leone’s NCDDR has drawn great interest from other 
African countries embarking on their own DDR programmes. An official with the 
World Bank characterized the US$36.5 million project as ‘the best practice example 
throughout the world of a successful disarmament demobilization reintegration 
programme’.2 In contrast, Alan Doss, head of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) office in Sierra Leone, correctly observed that the former 
combatants ‘have joined another, a larger army of young people who are seeking gainful 
employment … [they] must now compete with all other citizens for any assistance or 
support provided by the government’ (quoted in UNOCHA 2004a). According to a 
report prepared by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2003: 1), a ‘large number of ex-
combatants [are] unhappy with the reintegration program and [are] facing bleak 
employment prospects in the formal economy’. For instance, part of the reason for the 
                                                 
1   Human security is a multi-faceted, albeit contested, term. See for example Burgess and Owen (2004) 
and Paris (2002).  
2   Murray, quoted in UNOCHA (2004a). 3 
very low wages paid to artisanal diamond miners is the influx of people from all part of 
the country to the diamond fields of Kono and Tongo. Thus, the sombre assessments 
offered by Doss and the ICG are prescient, as one wonders what type or level of support 
the incumbent SLPP government will provide given its lack of capacity and resources. 
In addition to former combatants, the civilian population must experience an 
improvement in living conditions and employment prospects. Over the past decade, 
Sierra Leone has been consistently ranked near or at the very bottom of the human 
development index (HDI) rankings, which is no surprise given the fact that the country 
was embroiled in protracted civil conflict. In 2004, the UNDP report ranked Sierra 
Leone 177
th out of 177 countries studied, with a HDI value of 0.273 (UNDP 2004: 142). 
In contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa received a score of 0.465. It is important to note that the 
2004 HDI values are based on 2002 figures. Therefore, technically, the civil war had 
just come to an official end, and it is not unreasonable to assume some improvement in 
this dismal ranking. 
Figure 1 includes several civil war years as well as the subsequent reconstruction phase 
in Sierra Leone. The ebb and flow of the civil war is reflected in the above statistics. 
Sierra Leone is also a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). Its budget is highly 
dependent upon external donor support. For instance, approximately 65 per cent of 
Sierra Leone’s government budget comes from the United Kingdom through the British 
Department for International Development (DFID) (Davies 2003: 5). While the meagre 
size of the government budget represents a serious impediment, political will to address 
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Source:  Simpson (2003: 27). 4 
the condition of the country’s poor must be amplified. All governments are faced with 
difficult choices in terms of expenditures of scarce resources. 
Employment prospects are slim, especially for those lacking technical or knowledge-
based skills. Even those in various professions, such as school and college teachers, 
often experience delays in receiving regular payment of wages. Casual employment 
opportunities may be found, though frequency varies considerably. For instance, adult 
casual labourers make about 80,000 Le per month (based on a 20-day, eight-hour-per-
day, five-day work week) in Freetown.3 No additional benefits such as health care, 
employment insurance, or pension, are received (or deducted). 
Amid the widespread poverty, which is particularly evident in Freetown, many new 
houses, shops, and small office buildings are either being built or renovated. While 
some of this economic activity may be attributed to a ‘spin-off’ effect from the presence 
of the UN and its various agencies, donor countries such as the UK and the USA, 
transnational NGOs, and aid organizations, wealth is being generated by other means. 
Likely suspects are illicit diamond exports and other forms of corruption in government.  
Foreign aid 
Foreign aid, if designed and implemented properly, provides an invaluable source of 
human security. As Addison (1998: 4) avers: 
while aid provides essential help, success ultimately depends upon the 
capacities and actions of national actors. These are: communities, 
entrepreneurs, and the state. But communities are impoverished, private sectors 
are underdeveloped, and states are weak. Success therefore requires 
overcoming each of these problems. 
Sierra Leone has a reputation for donor dependence. According to the World Food 
Programme (WFP), aid accounts for approximately 60 per cent of Sierra Leone’s gross 
national product (GNP).4 Yet, during the first decade of independence, the country 
received only a modest amount of foreign aid. 
Including the final year of British colonial rule (1960), Sierra Leone received a total of 
US$125.3 million from 1960 to 1969.5 Figure 2 displays the annual amounts of foreign 
aid received by Sierra Leone from 1960 to 2002. Interestingly, Sierra Leone produced 
an outflow of US$2.3 million in various forms of assistance funds in 1970. As Stevens 
consolidated his power base, foreign aid receipts began to grow. Under the kleptocratic 
and often incompetent regimes of Stevens and Momoh, substantial foreign aid inflows 
became a regular occurrence in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1991, hundreds of millions of 
dollars in foreign aid was entering the country each year. From 1971 to 2002, Sierra 
Leone received a total of US$3.48 billion in various forms of foreign aid. 
                                                 
3   Author’s interview with a member of the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), Freetown, Sierra 
Leone, 10 June 2003. 
4   World Food Programme (2005). 
5   Data derived from OECD (various years). This sum comprises total amounts of official development 
assistance (ODA), other bilateral transactions know as other official flows (OOFs), and private sector 
flows (PSFs), which include guaranteed export credits and private bank loans. 5 
Much of the foreign aid funds benefited Sierra Leone’s ruling elites indirectly through 
dubious development schemes or patronage rents. During the cold war, donors would 
often turn a blind eye to government corruption or mismanagement of aid funds. 
Although bad governance by recipients of aid funds has not been eradicated, donors 
have attempted to cut down on these practices by linking funds to democratic elections 
and good governance in recipient states. The relationship remains problematic, as 
withheld foreign aid hurts those most in need. 
Recent inflows of various forms of foreign aid have been instrumental in bolstering the 
human security of Sierra Leoneans. For instance, Sierra Leone received about 89,000 
metric tons of food aid in 2002.6 In addition to foreign aid, Sierra Leone has benefited 
from direct and indirect spending by the international community. As one report put it: 
‘The international community has invested billions of US dollars to end the civil war 
and move the country toward peace’ (ICG 2003: i). The UN has spent hundreds of 
millions of dollars as part of its operations in Sierra Leone. For example, from 1 July 
2003 to 30 June 2004, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) budget 
was US$543.49 million. UNAMSIL’s approved budget for 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 
is US$291.6 million.7  
Although foreign aid is a welcome source of external support for reconstruction efforts, 
it is finite like any other resource. Donor fatigue with respect to Sierra Leone may very 
well set in—perhaps a question of ‘when’ rather than ‘if’. 
Figure 2 
Total aid to Sierra Leone, 1960-2002 
   Source:  OECD (various years). 
 
                                                 
6   World Food Programme (2005). 
7   United Nations (2005). 6 
3  State and society 
The state is often in a position of weakness following the cessation of hostilities. Indeed, 
as Bornstein and Munro (2003: 221) assert, ‘A central difficulty of war-torn societies is 
that the state is both an agent and an object of reconstruction’. It follows that during 
post-conflict reconstruction, one of the main goals is to strengthen the political authority 
of the state. In other words, there is a concerted effort to boost state sovereignty. This is 
particularly important after a civil war, wherein the legitimacy of the incumbent 
government may be either questionable or fragile. Democratic elections are now 
considered an essential first step in this regard (although elections can also cause new 
tensions). Thus, it is unsurprising that elections are often held shortly after the formal 
end of hostilities in order to confer a measure of legitimacy to the governing regime. 
This was the case in Sierra Leone, as presidential and parliamentary elections were held 
four months after the conclusion of the civil war. 
Although President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was re-elected and the governing SLPP 
retained its parliamentary majority—both by comfortable margins—in May 2002, the 
electorate has become increasingly unhappy with the lack of improvement in the 
economy and a host of other issues pertaining to reconstruction. Local NGOs, such as 
the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) and the Network Movement for Justice and 
Development (NMJD), have a reputation for pressing the government for positive 
change. The government is also subject to a vocal and often critical private press, 
dominated by approximately 50 newspapers that are published either daily or weekly 
and exhibit varying degrees of editorial and reporting quality (Reno 2004: 14-6). News 
stories of government corruption or complaints pertaining to lack of government 
capacity to provide various public services tend to dominate the front and rear pages of 
these thin periodicals. Government corruption and weak capacity were problems well 
before the civil war began; thus, the simple act of holding free and fair elections should 
not be expected to solve these problems.  
If reconstruction plans are to be effective, then international aid agencies must focus on 
addressing one of the leading causes of Sierra Leone’s civil war: corruption. Not only 
are foreign donors wary of corruption, but so too—and perhaps most importantly for 
long-term reconstruction and sustainable economic growth—are foreign investors. Of 
course, eradicating corruption is easier said than done. This applies to the diamond 
industry as well, though difficult to prove. Nevertheless, some relatively inexpensive 
though useful changes could be implemented, such as drastically improving 
transparency in government accounts and its awarding of contracts and giving the Anti-
Corruption Commission (ACC) greater autonomy by moving to an ‘arms’ length’ 
position  vis-à-vis the office of the president. Granting the ACC greater powers to 
prosecute suspected offenders will also help address corruption. However, given the 
problems within Sierra Leone’s judicial system, ranging from lack of funding to reports 
of bribery,8 strengthening the ACC may accomplish little over the short term. 
Improving government capacity is no easy feat. But, reducing government corruption 
will have a positive effect on its ability to implement policy, enforce laws and 
regulations, and ensure that scarce funds reach those segments of the population in 
greatest need. Sierra Leone’s score is still low in terms of ‘anti-corruption and 
                                                 
8   See for example ICG (2003 and 2004). 7 
transparency’ at 3.01 out of a possible 7 points (Reno 2004: 1). If the perception grows 
that corruption has decreased in Sierra Leone, then international and bilateral aid and 
lending agencies will have greater confidence in allocating assistance to the country. 
This will be key in terms of securing funds for medium- and long-term reconstruction 
and development. 
While it is easier to measure the impact of large-scale reconstruction projects that 
rebuild physical infrastructure, reconstruction of the social fabric of Sierra Leonean 
society is equally important. Public goods such as ‘justice’ are subjective and open to 
varying interpretations, and therefore escape easy quantification. Though, if any lesson 
is to be learned from Sierra Leone’s civil war and the preceding decades of poor 
governance, it is that sources of political, economic, and social grievances cannot be 
ignored. Sierra Leone established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and 
hosts its own Special Court, a hybrid-type of tribunal that is administered in conjunction 
with the UN. The United Kingdom’s DFID and the International Military Advisory and 
Training Team (IMATT) each have instituted several programmes aimed at 
ameliorating civil-military relations throughout Sierra Leone. While the UN and three 
G-8 members—the UK, the US, and Canada—have provided personnel, training, 
material, as well as logistical and financial support to Sierra Leone, the aforementioned 
initiatives are in jeopardy due to a lack of funding. Despite the high expectations the 
TRC, which held hearings from April to August 2003, it was forced to operate on a 
shoestring budget. The TRC received US$2.3 million in funding—just over half of its 
projected budget (Reno 2004: 8). Aside from the opening ceremonies, most sessions of 
the TRC were poorly attended (particularly the sessions that were held in Freetown) 
both by those expected to testify and by the general public. Much more local and 
international media attention was allocated to the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL), which had already issued a number of indictments and was perceived as having 
more clout in terms of adjudicating war crimes.  
Amid concerns regarding future funding needs and projected operating costs, the new 
edifice constructed to house the SCSL was officially inaugurated on 10 March 2004 
under tight security. The SCSL—whose construction cost of US$3.4 million was paid 
for by the USA along with several other foreign countries—now enjoys permanent 
chambers in which to prosecute the indictments it issued to individuals accused of war 
crimes committed during the civil war. In June 2004, the SCSL heard its first set of 
cases. Eight counts—consisting of various violations of international law including war 
crimes and crimes against humanity—have been levied against former CDF leaders 
Sam Hinga Norman, Allieu Kondewa, and Moinina Fofana. The case against Norman, a 
former Minister of Internal Affairs in Kabbah’s government, has drawn the most 
criticism,9 as many see him as being instrumental in garnering much needed military 
assistance to pro-government forces by leading the Kamajors and the CDF. Although 
the CDF’s tactics were at times nearly as brutal as the RUF’s, the former did provide 
much-needed support for UN forces and British troops during the final years of the 
conflict. Many commentators, ranging from outside observers to Sierra Leoneans 
themselves, have questioned the validity of Norman’s indictment. Op-ed pieces calling 
for Norman’s release are common in Sierra Leone’s daily and weekly newspapers. 
                                                 
9   See for example Penhold in Gberie (2005b, p. 122). 8 
During the inauguration of the SCSL, a group of demonstrators clad in ‘Free Hinga 
Norman’ t-shirts protested against Hinga’s indictment and demanded his release.10 
Some commentators fear that this joint trial of former CDF leaders presents the gravest 
threat to Sierra Leone’s internal security. The Kamajors—the largest contingent within 
the CDF—are generally unhappy that Hinga, Kondewa, and Fofana are facing charges 
before the SCSL. The Kamajors have retained some semblance of organizational 
readiness despite assurances that they were disbanded in 2002. In contrast, after 
conducting numerous interviews with former CDF combatants and UNAMSIL officials, 
an ICG report concluded that a lack of manpower and weaponry means that although 
‘the Kamajors could cause local disruptions, there is little evidence they could 
destabilize the country’ (ICG 2003: 14). In any case, the security situation within Sierra 
Leone will change once UNAMSIL’s 3,230 peacekeeping troops depart by 31 
December 2005.  
A trio of former RUF leaders are also on trial at the SCSL. The RUF has been disarmed, 
demobilized, and metamorphosed into a formal—albeit unsuccessful—political party. 
Yet, like the CDF, former RUF combatants have not completely ‘disappeared’. Some 
former RUF combatants have crossed into Liberia. While Liberia’s civil war came to a 
close in August 2003, the UN has yet to make its presence felt in much of the outlying 
areas of the country. There is very little in the way of government presence (military or 
police) in Lofa County of Liberia and the ‘Parrot’s Beak’ region of Guinea and 
surrounding border areas. Thus, the border region between Sierra Leone, Liberia, and 
Guinea provides an ideal, remote area in which to hide or attempt to blend back into 
local communities. Although there are rumours that small caches of weapons exist in 
parts of Sierra Leone and that groups of RUF combatants could resurrect themselves on 
relatively short notice,11 the group is a shell of its former self and poses no veritable 
threat to the current peace. 
4  Internal resources: from agriculture to diamonds 
Reconstruction efforts must also be sustained from internal resources, such as tax 
revenues from the export of rough diamonds and other commodities to various indirect 
revenues from overall trade of goods and services. Agriculture is important not only for 
feeding the domestic population, but also for export earnings. Prior to the start of the 
civil war, Sierra Leone’s agricultural sector accounted for just over half of the country’s 
GDP.12 Food security is an important component of human security. The reintroduction 
of livestock to rural areas following the civil war is a small yet important step in 
rebuilding the food-producing capacity of the country. While chickens remain 
ubiquitous, the sighting of the occasional cow along the route from Mile 91 to Kenema, 
for example, was perceived by one aid worker to be a very important indicator that an 
                                                 
10  According to one report, police arrested five of the demonstrators for failing to register their protest; 
however, the demonstrators were later released and the charges were apparently dismissed 
(UNOCHA, 2004b). 
11  Author’s personal communication with an aid worker, Koidu, Kono District, Sierra Leone, 10 May 
2003. 
12  World Food Programme (2005). 9 
initial step towards agricultural recovery in the rural parts of the country had begun.13 A 
similar example of animal husbandry is that pigs are steadily being reintroduced to 
smallholder farms. However, agricultural production in Sierra Leone suffers from low 
export prices, infrastructural impediments such as poor roads, and slow (and corrupt) 
seaports. Sierra Leone, once self-sufficient in foodstuffs and an exporter of its main 
dietary staple—rice—imports food and receives food aid. It is not uncommon to come 
across food items clearly labelled as international food aid—donated through agencies 
such as the WFP or bilateral donor countries—for sale in small market stalls throughout 
the country. This practice is not confined to Sierra Leone, for the ‘re-sale’ or trade of 
donated foodstuffs is but one facet of the political economy of international food aid. 
As the country progresses along the path to reconstruction and domestic food 
production increases, it is expected that food aid needs will diminish. Yet, this 
expectation should not be taken as fact. Sierra Leone’s agricultural production also 
suffers from a shortage of manpower. The lure of ‘striking it rich’ in the diamond mines 
draws a large number of potential workers away from the agricultural sector. This is a 
definite limitation of relying on diamonds as a primary means of reconstruction. 
Flooding the labour market in the diamond sector will further reduce the already paltry 
wages paid to miners. By definition, subsistence farming will not witness a 
proportionate rise in wages due to fewer farmers. Rather, agricultural production is 
expected to fall. 
In a similar vein, Sierra Leone has sizeable deposits of rutile, bauxite, gold, iron ore, 
and other minerals, though the focus of export-led reconstruction inevitably centres on 
diamonds. On the one hand, this is not surprising given the importance of diamond 
exports to the Sierra Leonean economy since the colonial era. Yet, on the other hand, 
diamonds have proven to be a problematic source of export earnings owing to 
challenges ranging from smuggling and illicit mining to government corruption. 
Furthermore, diamonds served to sustain the rebel group, RUF, whose particularly 
vicious methods of striking fear in the hearts of civilian populations (e.g., amputation of 
various body parts and rape) eventually brought attention to not only the civil war but 
also the trade of ‘conflict’ or ‘blood’ diamonds. These notorious qualities 
notwithstanding, diamonds persist as a panacea of sorts for many outside observers and 
Sierra Leoneans alike—a means to solve all of Sierra Leone’s economic ills. 
4.1  Sierra Leone’s diamonds14 
Diamonds played an important role in Sierra Leone’s civil war (Reno 1995, 1998: 
113-45; Abiodun 1999; Zack-Williams 1999; Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton 2000; 
Hirsch 2001; Grant 2005). And, depending on whom you talk to, diamonds are either a 
blessing or a curse for Sierra Leone. Regardless, diamond revenues represent an 
important component of Sierra Leone’s economy. In terms of employment, diamond 
mining is the leading employer of unskilled labour. Diamond mining is also an 
important supporter of dependent industries. Income earned by miners attracts small-
scale traders of foodstuffs and other small consumer items to the mining areas and 
                                                 
13  Author’s personal communication with an aid worker, Kenema, Kenema District, Sierra Leone, 8 May 
2003. 
14  Parts of this section draw upon the author’s contribution to Gberie (2004). 10 
nearby villages and towns. During the first part of the 1990s, diamonds comprised about 
20 per cent of total export earnings. Owing to the disruption of rutile and ilmenite 
production in January 1995 because of the war—which had garnered about half of all 
export earnings—diamonds have become the primary income earner for the economy 
and, indeed, government coffers.   
Those who believe that diamonds are a curse for Sierra Leone point to the corrupt 
handling of diamond revenues under the regimes of Stevens and Momoh, and to the 
civil war itself. The legacy of government corruption and conflict diamonds combined 
with the importance of diamonds to the country’s economy makes Sierra Leone a prime  
candidate for following the prescriptions of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(KPCS),15 which is the main regulatory document of the Kimberley Process. Since its 
inception in 2000, the Kimberley Process has sought to end the trade of conflict 
diamonds through multilateral efforts aimed at imposing strict verification and trade 
controls on diamonds based on the collaboration of not only state actors, but also non-
state actors such as diamond firms and industry associations as well as NGOs (Grant 
and Taylor 2004). When referring to the KPCS, Sierra Leone’s Minister of Mineral 
Resources, Alhaji M. S. Deen (2003: 4-5) stated: ‘We expect that the impact of this 
process on the diamond trade, especially in Sierra Leone, will be spectacular’. 
Figure 3 depicts the rapid increase in diamond exports through official, government of 
Sierra Leone, channels. The recorded output by value for 2004 more than tripled the 
country’s output for 2002. Notably, Sierra Leonean diamonds tend to be of excellent 
quality, thereby fetching a high average price per carat. 
Figure 3 

































Source:   Government of Sierra Leone Gold and Diamond Department (GDD). 
                                                 
15  Available at www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/content/KPCS.pdf. Accessed 11 June 2005. 11 
While these numbers are impressive, some industry experts remain doubtful that all of 
Sierra Leone’s diamonds are passing through licit conduits: ‘the majority of gemstones 
mined are still smuggled out of the country. Independent estimates value Sierra Leone’s 
annual production of diamonds at US US$200 million to US US$400 million’ 
(UNOCHA 2003). Decades of corruption, mismanagement, and smuggling of the 
country’s diamond resources—not to mention the threats to human security posed by 
conflict diamonds—present monumental challenges to effective and equitable 
governance of this all-important mineral. Given the aforementioned disparity between 
the value of legally exported diamonds and smuggled diamonds, it is important to assess 
the extent to which the Sierra Leonean government—through the use of its Certificate 
of Origin and national legislation under the 1994 Mines and Minerals Act—is 
effectively implementing the KPCS’s minimum standards.  
In Sierra Leone, the designated export authority of diamond resources is the Gold and 
Diamond Department (GDD), which falls under the jurisdiction of the National 
Revenue Agency (NRA). The GDD coordinates very closely with the Ministry of 
Mineral Resources (MMR). Following valuation, the GDD is responsible for collecting 
the 3 per cent levy on all exported diamonds. While this figure may seem small to some, 
the portion to be directed to community development projects in the mining regions 
through the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF) is expected to 
reach as much as US$950,250 for 2004. Also, there is a fear that a high tax rate will 
encourage diamond exporters to either evade or actively subvert official channels and 
encourage smuggling. This 3 per cent levy is then allocated accordingly: DACDF, 0.75 
per cent; GDD, 0.75 per cent; ‘special training’, 0.75 per cent; external/independent 
valuator, 0.50 per cent; and Mines Monitoring Unit (MMU), 0.25 per cent.  
Individuals convicted of contravening the laws of the Mines and Minerals Act are 
subject to fines and/or jail time as well as having their diamonds, mining implements, 
and related equipment confiscated. Non-citizens face expulsion from Sierra Leone after 
the fines are paid and/or jail time is served. In a September 2003 court decision, former 
Transport and Communications Minister, Momoh Pujeh, was sentenced to two years in 
jail for the illegal possession of diamonds (PANA Press 2003a). 
Sierra Leone’s so-called ‘40 per cent’ law is an incentive to encourage individuals to 
report illicit diamond mining. The informant receives 40 per cent of the value of illicit 
diamonds that are seized by the authorities. This law (which also applies to illicitly 
mined gold) has demonstrated modest success since its recent inception. As of early 
2003, a total of US$100,000 in illicitly mined diamonds and gold had been seized as a 
result of the 40 per cent law (Kamara 2003: 12). While raids based on informant tips or 
other information sources tend to be successful in terms of seizing illicitly mined 
diamonds and arresting illicit miners and dealers, the raids are infrequent due primarily 
to a lack of financial resources. While mines wardens and monitors are responsible for 
the bulk of the internal controls of Sierra Leone’s diamond industry, the Sierra Leone 
Police (SLP) often provides support in the field. In November 2003, four SLP officers 
embarked on a six-week course in South Africa to receive training in policing strategies 
and criminal investigation methods with respect to diamond mining (PANA Press 
2003b). 
Overall, Sierra Leone deserves a satisfactory grade on sincerity and desire, as Sierra 
Leone’s national diamond certification scheme reflects much of the spirit of the 
Kimberley Process and meets several ‘minimum standards’ as set out in the KPCS. For 12 
instance, the GDD maintains an up-to-date (with a one- to two-month lag) set of 
diamond export statistics as well as a database containing the names, addresses, and 
license numbers (with date of granting) of all diamond exporters. Sierra Leone’s export 
certificate along with the container, bag, and seal are what might be best described as 
forgery- and tamper-resistant (rather than forgery- and tamper-proof). Though not 
required by KPCS minimum standards, Sierra Leone’s so-called ‘40 per cent’ law has 
enjoyed some success as an incentive to encourage individuals to report illicit diamond 
mining. 
While the above efforts are laudable, it should be emphasized that Sierra Leone’s 
national certification scheme does not meet all KPCS minimum standards. Perhaps the 
most glaring deficiency is the lack of a veritable audit trail from diamond mine to 
market. According to KPCS minimum standards, a chain of custody that can be checked 
back from the GDD to dealers to diggers is supposed to be in operation. While a 
detailed database of digger, dealer, and exporter licensees could be established, there is 
no rule in place that requires the inclusion of the digger and/or dealer on Sierra Leone’s 
Certificate of Origin for diamonds. Even if the name and license number of the digger 
and dealer were required on the Certificate of Origin, it is unclear how this information 
could be verified under the current structure of the certification regime in Sierra Leone. 
Moreover, the current Certificate of Origin does not specify the exact mine of 
provenance of the parcel of diamonds. In fact, many parcels of diamonds submitted for 
valuation and certification by diamond exporters at the GDD come from several 
different mines and kingdoms (administrative sub-districts). 
An important aspect of KPCS minimum standards is the ability of a member country 
and its government agencies to enforce its national certification scheme. In Sierra 
Leone, mines wardens and monitoring officers not only lack in-depth police training, 
but also face logistical challenges to proper monitoring and enforcement of diamond 
mining and dealing regulations due to poor infrastructure (i.e., lack of proper 
transportation and communication technologies).16 These challenges add to the already 
daunting task of policing a wide geographic area that is difficult to traverse. Rumours 
also abound that bribery of mines wardens, monitoring officers, and customs officials is 
not uncommon. The meagre wages of those responsible for enforcing many of the rules 
and regulations of the diamond certification scheme contribute to the likelihood of 
asking for ‘tips’ or even the acceptance of outright bribes (Ndola-Myers 2003: 80).  
5 Conclusion 
While foreign donors have been footing the bill for reconstruction projects such as the 
recently concluded NCDDR programme, it is uncertain what level of international aid 
will be received by Sierra Leone in the medium and long term. The source of this 
uncertainty rests on the fact that foreign aid is subject to myriad factors within donor 
and recipient states as well as in the international arena. Post-conflict reconstruction 
projects in Africa and other parts of the world will continue to draw upon a limited pool 
of foreign aid. Regionally, several West African countries are experiencing varying 
bouts of insecurity. Liberia is already drawing away foreign aid and other external 
                                                 
16  These concerns are also echoed in Gberie (2005a) as well as in the findings of a February 2005 
Kimberley Process ‘Review Mission’ to Sierra Leone. See UNSC (2005, Para. 22). 13 
sources of assistance after its own period of civil war and venal governance under 
Charles Taylor. Côte d’Ivoire remains unstable, and the future of Guinea is clouded, as 
rumours of an impending coup persist. Guinean president Lansana Conté’s health is 
poor, and his grip on an opaque regime may be slipping. 
Internal sources of reconstruction are equally uncertain, though for different reasons. 
Diamond exports have been growing at a healthy rate since the final years of the civil 
war, particularly since the official end of hostilities at the beginning of 2002. While this 
appears promising, several obstacles remain. First, diamond smuggling and illicit 
mining persist in Sierra Leone, despite the strengthening of legislation. The combination 
of weak state capacity and the logistical barriers to adequately policing artisanal 
diamond mining is daunting. Second, regional instability may place the diamond mines 
at risk once again should hostilities resume in Liberia or emerge in Guinea. 
Furthermore, it is risky to rely on a single commodity for the bulk of export earnings. 
Rough diamond prices have stayed remarkably stable, and demand is strong. For 
instance, the chances of a consumer boycott of diamonds are slim. However, diamond 
resources themselves are finite. Although estimates of Sierra Leone’s diamonds reserves 
are often quite large, they are just that—estimates. Some offshore oil exists, but the 
contractual process surrounding the bidding for drilling blocks has taken longer than 
originally envisioned. Sierra Leone’s fisheries are subject to poaching by foreign 
trawlers, as enforcement of fishing rights and boundaries is virtually non-existent. The 
impending return of rutile and bauxite extraction will help, but the problem of relying 
on finite, non-renewable resources remains.  
The present challenge is to focus on more medium- and long-term reconstruction 
solutions. While this may entail more conventional forms of development, lessons from 
the past must be heeded in order to reduce the potential for waste and corruption. As 
Addison (1998: 30) reminds us: ‘Public money must be focused on core services of 
most benefit to the poor. These include primary education, basic health services and 
safe water and sanitation’. However, this will likely prove difficult to implement, as 
neo-liberal strategies tend to concentrate on reducing government expenditures and 
taxation. This favours the wealthier segments of society, not the poor.  
If ‘hope for the future’ is to be realized, the psychological and physical trauma endured 
by the people of Sierra Leone cannot be ignored by efforts to spur economic growth and 
reconstruction. This is crucial to prevent a resumption of the vicious cycle of greed and 
grievance that led to the outbreak of civil war in the first place. The overarching goal of 
reconstruction should be broad-based, sustainable, and equitable in terms of economic 
and social development. Yet, the aforementioned evidence suggests that the prospects 
for Sierra Leone’s post-conflict reconstruction remain uncertain at best. 
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